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Nationalism and Islam in Cold War
Turkey, 194469
_ILKER AYT€URK*
In the introduction to his popular study of the history of Turkish nationalism, _Ilhan
E. Darendelioglu, a nationalist and anti-communist journalist, complained that for
many years Turkish nationalism suffered from an unfair association with Kemalism.
From its moment of birth, which antedated the republic, Turkish nationalism was
imbued with the Islamic spirit, according to the author, but secularist militancy of
the Kemalist ruling elite had spread the fundamentally wrong image that all national-
ists lost touch with the religion of their people. ‘This book . . . will clearly prove’,
Darendelioglu wrote in the late 1960s, ‘that, today, Turkish nationalism returned
back to the Turkish-Islamic consciousness, which was its previous and real source;
and the futility and fragility of an irreligious patriotism devoid of a sacred belief sys-
tem has long been understood.’1 The belief that Turkish national identity cannot be
disentangled from its Islamic context dominates the academic study of Turkish
nationalism as well. G€okhan C¸etinsaya, for example, claims that there was no essen-
tial ‘contradiction’ between religion (Islam) and nationalism in Turkish political
thought2 and that those ‘who reject Islam as a crucial component of Turkish nation-
alism are exceptional, such as in Kemalist nationalism and Turanism’.3
This view is problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, a theory which aims
to explain the relationship between Turkish nationalism and Islam has scarcely any
explanatory value if it writes off the two hugely influential, Kemalist and Turanist,
varieties of nationalism as mere exceptions to the norm. Secondly, ‘the harmony the-
sis’ is not corroborated by facts. The typical Turkish nationalist of the period extend-
ing from 1908 to 1944, which witnessed the rise of ‘the first generation’ of Turkish
nationalism, was not an Islamic-leaning conservative. On the contrary, with very few
exceptions, he or she would generally espouse a progressive and revolutionary set of
ideas for those years, which were meant to transcend the late Ottoman status quo. In
vast numbers, Turkish nationalists supported the transformation from empire to a
republic, carried out a series of westernizing reforms and did not object to the sym-
bolic reforms of the early republic which aimed to make Turkey and the Turks look
more western, and championed full legal and political equality for women and their
integration into public life. Most importantly, the first generation of Turkish
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nationalists were, again with few exceptions, a secular and secularizing elite. The best
example of the attitude of this generation toward religion can be found in none other
than Ziya G€okalp (18761924), arguably the most important ideologue of Turkish
nationalism in the twentieth century. Basically, G€okalp regarded the Islamic civiliza-
tion as a spent force and did not expect it to resume its long-gone glory in the modern
world; that is why he recommended that the Turks switch to the western, European
world of nations. The role he reserved for Islam in the construction of Turkish
national identity, on the other hand, is manifestly subordinate when compared with
the role played by ethnic culture.4 His programme for the Turkification of Islam,
which included translation of the Arabic call to prayer (ezan) and the Koran into
Turkish by the government and the employment of this official translation in Muslim
prayers, was going to become a major source of embarrassment for future genera-
tions of Turkish nationalists.5 In other words, Turkish nationalism was born at the
turn of the century as a secular, positivist and revolutionary ideology and the hege-
mony of Islam over Turkish culture and society was undoubtedly part of what
nationalists revolted against. It is no wonder pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists
regarded each other as ideological adversaries in the 1910s and were locked in a bat-
tle of ideas that was fought in the late Ottoman press to the bitter end.
Whether or not there is a contradiction between nationalism and Islam has basi-
cally been a theological question which has occupied and divided Turkish Islamists
for more than a century now. Turkish nationalists, on the other hand, walked a
much more pragmatic and non-doctrinaire path. Knowing too well that they were
operating in a predominantly Muslim environment, nationalists of all stripes either
embraced Islam or were prepared to include it as a building block of Turkish
national identity to varying degrees. In that sense, one could easily make the case
that Kemalists and Turanists did not constitute exceptions either, because they, too,
spared room for their sanitized version of Islam in the making of Turkishness. There-
fore, while all important ideologues of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century
agreed with the ‘harmony thesis’ in principle, this does not change the fact that the
precise role of Islam in the construction of Turkish national identity was and contin-
ues to be the inevitable and most hotly debated topic of their books, journals, pam-
phlets, speeches and private conversations. Arguably, there was no other dispute
that pitted factions of nationalists against each other with the same level of intensity
and rancour.6
This article maintains that the ‘harmony thesis’ obscures a rich history of national-
ist reflections on Islam. It aims to transcend the discourse of harmony by shifting the
focus to those reflections and debates. Indeed Turkish nationalists did not see a con-
tradiction between nationalism and Islam. But of tension there was plenty. Amus-
ingly, the situation resembled Christological debates on the exact nature of Jesus in
early Christianity. Was Jesus human, or divine, or both? And if both, how did those
two combine in his person? The Nicene Creed was the response to those questions
and it settled the problem  at least for mainstream Christians  by declaring that
Jesus was both fully human and fully divine, and those two natures co-existed in his
person in a Hypostatic Union, which we mortals could hardly fathom. Unfortunately
for Turkish nationalists, they could not formulate a Nicene Creed of their own. Their
failure to reconcile authoritatively the Islamic and ethnic components of Turkish
identity proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the movement and it has, up to this day,
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exposed them in the most compromising way to their bitterest rivals in the Turkish
right, the political Islamists.
The time span to be covered in this article overlaps with the onset and deepening of
the Cold War, the point of departure being the Racism-Turanism trials of 1944.
From the late nineteenth century to 1944, Turkish nationalists preserved a fac¸ade of
unity, while disputes over doctrine or daily politics were systematically swept under
the carpet. The year 1944, however, witnessed a break in the ranks, as Kemalists
took legal action against Racist-Turanists and purged them from positions of influ-
ence. The impact of the trials on Turkish public opinion and intelligentsia was pro-
found: Kemalists finally dissociated themselves from ethnic nationalism in discourse,
if not always in practice; and radical nationalist individuals, who had so far been tol-
erated or even welcomed within the ruling Kemalist bloc, suddenly found themselves
personae non gratae. The fact that some nationalists had now become opponents of
the Turkish regime was a first in republican history. In this sense, 1944 should be
considered a turning point in the history of Turkish nationalism. The end date, on
the other hand, is 1969, when the Nationalist Action Party, was born as the political
arm of the nationalist movement at the Adana Congress of 1969, an event that also
confirmed and consolidated the Islamic turn in Turkish nationalism.
The history of Turkish nationalist thought in the aftermath of the Second World
War is a much-neglected field. This undeserved neglect is the outcome of two biases
that we encounter in the academic studies on Turkish nationalism. The first bias is
the widespread conviction that Turkish nationalism, just like other nationalisms for
that matter, is mere rhetoric and thus not worthy of scholarly attention. Bringing to
mind Benedict Anderson’s famous indictment that ‘unlike other isms, nationalism
has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes or
Webers’,7 the few specialists in the field of Turkish nationalism generally focused on
the history of nationalist institutions only, ignoring immense ideological transforma-
tions which took place within Turkish nationalist thought after 1944.8
The second bias, on the other hand, is temporal: whereas the history of Turkish
nationalism before 1944 and after 1980 has received some academic attention, it is
not an exaggeration to call the period between those years the movement’s terra
incognita. Even those scholars who studied the history of nationalist thought in Tur-
key tended to concentrate on such topics as the genesis of Turkish nationalism at the
end of the nineteenth century,9 the impact of Ziya G€okalp, ethnic and cultural
nationalism in the early republican era,10 and, finally, the emergence of a racist
movement in the early 1940s.11 Post-1980 developments have also received some
attention.12 The second bias in the field, in other words, is the assumption that all
developments of ideological significance in the history of nationalist ideas had
already taken place before 1944,13 and that after this date nationalist thought atro-
phied and, instead of shaping nationalist politics and activism on the streets, it trailed
behind them.
Obviously, Turkish nationalism did not produce another Ziya G€okalp between
1944 and 1980, or since. However, this article takes issue with the dominant tendency
in the literature, which considers this period barren and uninteresting from the van-
tage point of the history of ideas. On the contrary, as this article aims to show, Cold
War years were rife with ideological tension between various nationalist factions
Nationalism and Islam in Cold War Turkey 695
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such as the Racist-Turanists,14 the Anatolianists (Anadolucular),15 the Intellectuals’
Hearth Movement (Aydınlar Ocagı)16 as well as the National-Strugglists (Milli
M€ucadeleciler),17 to name just the most prominent groups. The debate on the rela-
tionship between national identity and Islam was going to be the most important
fault line dividing them.
Kemalist attitudes toward Islam ranged from patronizing reformism to outright hos-
tility. This is a particularly well-studied aspect of the Kemalist Revolution.18
As expected, Kemalism  to the extent that we could talk about it as a monolithic
ideology  aimed to cast a national identity for the Turkish-speaking Muslim popu-
lation of the republic and to base this identity on the secular pillars of ethnic lan-
guage and history/memory.19 However, another attribute, Islam, was either ignored
or, when that was not possible, it was incorporated as an instrument of control whose
archaic mould, it was hoped, could temporarily contain social unrest, that is until this
function too became superfluous as a result of Kemalist modernization. In the eyes of
Kemalists, Islam was an integral part  if not the main cause  of an unfortunate
package of poverty, backwardness and political impotence. This Kemalist view of
Islam was not going to change until the coup d’etat of 1980, when the generals, mak-
ers of the Kemalist ideology and its guardians, finally decided to allow a greater role
for Islam in order to combat the rising tide of socialism in Turkey. Be that as it may,
Kemalist attitudes toward Islam remained more or less stagnant from 1923 to 1980
and the historian of this period is unlikely to chance upon a hidden surprise.
Therefore, the main protagonists of this article are the non-Kemalist nationalists,
who fell out with the Turkish government in 1944. This group, too, was far from
being monolithic and lacked a common roadmap for political action. Nominally,
they were all nationalists, but they disagreed profoundly over what that meant
exactly. What really united them more than anything else was their opposition to
communism, on the one hand, and the single-party regime of the Republican
People’s Party (RPP), on the other. Even there, one could detect different shades of
opposition. While some distinguished between the two early republican presidents,
Kemal Atat€urk and _Ismet _In€on€u  usually blaming everything on the latter  others
thought both equally dreadful. Another disagreement centred on the legacy of the
Kemalist Revolution. On the one hand, there were extremists who regarded the
Kemalist reforms as a malignant growth in the otherwise robust frame of the Turkish-
Muslim body politic and prescribed a root and branch extirpation, a Kemalectomy
that would bring this sacrilegious episode to an end once and for all. Others, how-
ever, raised objections either on pragmatic grounds (Kemalists were still powerful;
was it a good idea to declare total war on them?), or in principle (those Kemalist
reforms which strengthened the nation-state could be retained, whereas the rest
ought to be discarded). Furthermore, a significant generational gap separated secular
nationalists such as Rıza Nur (18791942),20 Nihal Atsız (190575)21 and Nejdet
Sanc¸ar (191075),22 who were born before 1923 and tended to be Racist-Turanists,
from later generations of Islamic-leaning nationalists. This obvious diversity within
the group defied attempts to find a proper name to describe and distinguish them
from the official, Kemalist branch of Turkish nationalism. Various proposals to call
them radical nationalists,23 hyper- or ultra-nationalists,24 right-wing nationalists25
and nationalist-conservatives or nationalist-sacredists26 are all problematic. The first
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three  the radical, the hyper and the ultra  reflect a normative, value-laden
approach to the phenomenon of nationalism, whereas the last two are not compre-
hensive enough. Right-wing nationalism, on the other hand, sounds like a better
term at first glance, but its applicability to an aggressively secular branch of national-
ism, such as Racist-Turanism, is questionable. Therefore, despite its clumsiness, the
term ‘non-Kemalist nationalism’ comes closest to capturing the essence of their com-
mon denominator.
Although the 1944 trials targeted the Racist-Turanists in particular, the crushing
impact of official repression nearly eliminated all competing interpretations of
Turkish national identity. By 1945 and 1946, when Turkey was undergoing another
political revolution and becoming a multiparty democracy, the non-Kemalist nation-
alists in opposition were disconnected and powerless. Continued pressure at that
point could have completely destroyed the last vestiges of their political influence,
leaving the Kemalist variety as the hegemonic nationalist discourse. Indeed, if the
RPP governments did not choose to silence them altogether, it was partly due to the
recognition, on the part of the authorities, that these non-Kemalist nationalists, who
were now considered beyond the pale of respectability, could still be useful against
the leftists in the emerging Cold War environment.27
There is also reason to attribute the RPP’s tolerance to necessities of daily politics.
From its foundation in 1946 to the 14 May 1950 general elections, the Democratic
Party (DP) emerged as the main rival to the ruling RPP. Founders of the DP were
actually a splinter group from the RPP, who accused their former party of curtailing
religious  that is, Islamic  freedom as well as ruining the Turkish economy by
excessive central planning. The Democrats occupied the centre-right of the political
spectrum and promised liberal economic reforms and a still secular but more respect-
ful attitude toward Islam. As Turkey slowly evolved into a multiparty democracy,
competition between the two parties was fierce.28 In all likelihood, the RPP leader-
ship was more lenient on the radical right than expected simply because, in this way,
they could divide the right into moderate and radical camps and break the monopoly
of the Democrats on the right-wing vote.
If that was RPP’s back-up plan, it did work for a couple of years. Kenan €Oner, an
Istanbul lawyer who made a name for himself by taking on the former Minister of
Education Hasan A^li Y€ucel in a lengthy court battle,29 emerged as a leading spokes-
person of right-wing interests in the second half of the 1940s and first joined the DP
in 1946, becoming the chairman of the party branch in _Istanbul. €Oner’s extremist
views on Islam, the RPP and the Kemalist reforms, however, veered too far to the
right for the DP mainstream’s middle-of-the-road approach. Therefore, as early as
1947, articles calling for a ‘nationalist’ party started to appear in the journals of the
radical right. In an interview he gave to Kızılelma, Nihal Atsız, the intellectual leader
of the non-Kemalist nationalists, described the Democrats as ‘accomplices’ in the
then 25-year-long RPP authoritarianism and, while he said the Democrats could be
preferred over the RPP, Atsız still invited all the Turkists  a euphemism for Racist-
Turanists, the main non-Kemalist nationalist group at the time  to establish a party
of their own. Atsız believed a nationalist party could garner 2530 per cent of the
votes.30 Another author, who wrote under a nationalist alias, drew attention
repeatedly  probably with an insider’s knowledge of €Oner’s activities  to the need
for a nationalist party and agreed with Atsız that the Democrats were no different
Nationalism and Islam in Cold War Turkey 697
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from the RPP when it came to diluting Turkish national identity by admitting Arme-
nians, Greeks and Jews into Turkishness.31
This right-wing coalition finally established the Millet Partisi (Nation Party, NP)
in July 1948.32 The recently retired chief of the general staff of the early republic,
Marshall Fevzi C¸akmak, assumed honorary leadership of the party. C¸akmak was
widely recognized as one of the three founding giants of the republic,33 a natural
successor to Atat€urk in 1938, and the only other systemic actor that could rival
and balance the leader of the RPP, President _Ismet _In€on€u. Ironically, C¸akmak’s
leadership was a greater threat to the DP than it was to the RPP, because had
€Oner and C¸akmak been able to campaign more energetically, there is no doubt
that the NP could have captured a big chunk of the DP votes. Both however were
quite infirm and, conveniently for the DP, €Oner died in 1949 and C¸akmak in 1950,
only one month before the general elections, a factor that explains the massive
defection of the NP voters to the DP. All in all, the NP’s initial success confirmed
the existence of an alienated mass of radical right-wing voters, composed of the
non-Kemalist nationalists and the Islamists, who were not satisfied with the DP’s
‘meek’ opposition to the RPP. It also showed the viability of a party, based on
that grassroots. From the late 1940s to the 1960s, this voter base and its political
representatives were collectively known as the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ılar, a term
that would roughly translate as nationalists who respect and uphold sacred Islamic
values.
The most important characteristic of the milliyetc¸i-mukkadesatc¸ı NP grassroots
was that it represented an instinctive but uncomfortable blend of nationalism and
Islam, which found its main outlet in opposing Kemalism and communism simulta-
neously. Modern techniques of measuring and analysing voting behaviour were
unknown then, but public opinion surveys conducted in the 1960s may shed some
light on earlier trends.34 Those studies indicate that republican-Kemalist values such
as nationalism and secularism did not seep into the uneducated and largely illiterate
rural periphery, which continued to take its inspiration from age-old local traditions
and Islam. Therefore, the NP grassroots in the Turkish periphery inclined more
towards an Islamic lifestyle and values than nationalism.
The situation was quite the reverse in the case of right-wing students at higher edu-
cation institutions who were gradually rising to prominence: new, right-wing mem-
bers of the Turkish intelligentsia such as Nurettin Topc¸u (190975), Osman Y€uksel
Serdengec¸ti (191783), _Ismail Hakkı Yılanlıoglu (191892), Hikmet Tanyu
(191892), Bekir Berk (192693), Fethi Gemuhluoglu (192277), D€undar Tas¸er
(192572), Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi (193288), Nevzat K€osoglu (b. 1940), Y€ucel Haca-
loglu (b. 1936), Erol G€ung€or (193883), Galip Erdem (193097), Ayvaz G€okdemir
(19422008), Sadi Somuncuoglu (b. 1940) and Taha Akyol (b. 1946) were put off by
the excesses of the Turkish la€ıcite just like the conservative, Islamic periphery from
which they almost invariably sprang. But, as much as they held Islam in the highest
regard, they still considered nationalism the other most important value-system that
shaped their worldviews, on a par with Islam. In that, one could discern a subtle, but
by no means insignificant, gap that separated the right-wing intelligentsia from the
milliyetc¸i-mukkadesatc¸ımasses that they were going to lead.
These right-wing authors, poets, artists, journalists and bureaucrats had already
become a fast-growing and very visible minority within the Turkish intelligentsia by
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the 1940s and their numbers and influence were going to increase in the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s. Most of them were born and raised in villages or small towns in the
Turkish periphery and graduated from provincial high schools. During those for-
mative early years, their political socialization took place in their patriarchal, con-
servative households or clandestine religious brotherhoods. Thus, when they first
arrived in _Istanbul or Ankara for university studies, the cultural shock was
immense. The positivistic, rationalist, secular and often bohemian outlook that
dominated the academic and the literary world as well as the art scene offended
their sensibilities; gender equality and women’s participation in public life hurt their
sense of honour; overall, they tended to blame this ‘urban decadence’ on the RPP
and the Kemalist super-westernization.35 Nevertheless, the non-Kemalist, anti-RPP,
right-wing intelligentsia was staunchly nationalist too, partly as a result of the Kem-
alist education system and partly because, in contradistinction to Islam, nationalism
offered a more legitimate and officially admissible grounds for opposition to the
RPP in those years.
After the 14 May 1950 general elections, the former NP grassroots continued to
exist as a discontented milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı voter group within the DP36 and they
brought enormous pressure to bear on the right-wing intelligentsia to unite and either
convince the DP leaders to adopt a more conservative, Islamist and ethnic nationalist
stance, or to reorganize separately outside the political umbrella of the DP. The call
for unity was very timely because, on the eve of the DP victory in 1950 and in its
aftermath, the right-wing intelligentsia was tormented by internal rifts and ideologi-
cal polarization. Brothers Nihal Atsız and Nejdet Sanc¸ar, for example, who belonged
to the earlier generation of secular nationalists, re-emerged as the most important
spokesmen of non-Kemalist nationalism and their journal Orkun (195052) became
the premier forum for criticizing the RPP legacy. Atsız and Sanc¸ar’s racism was no
longer as fashionable as it used to be in the early 1940s and their secular predisposi-
tion irritated many. However, Atsız was still a hero in the eyes of all conservatives
for being one of the courageous few who openly and loudly criticized Atat€urk, _In€on€u
and the Kemalist Revolution during the single-party era.37 Having spent several
years in prison and sacrificed his academic career for this cause, Atsız now hoped to
lead the Turkish nationalists as their ideological mentor. But that was an extremely
unlikely scenario: the new, post-1944 recruits to the cause of Turkish nationalism,
the so-called ‘younger generation’, did not necessarily share Atsız’s enthusiasm for
pan-Turanianism; they were upset by Atsız’s secularist, unorthodox approach
toward Islam; and, finally, they were reluctant to promote to a leadership position a
man who was known for ruthlessly excluding anyone who disagreed with him.
Yet pressure from the grassroots was such that some attempts were made to bring
all non-Kemalist nationalists  both secular and Islamist factions  together within
a single organizational framework. In April 1950, representatives of several national-
ist societies and organizations based in Ankara, _Istanbul and other provincial towns
met in _Istanbul and established the Milliyetc¸iler Federasyonu (Federation of Nation-
alists) as the first step toward unification. Bekir Berk, a young Istanbul lawyer who
was known as a radical, nationalist critic of Kemalism and the RPP, was elected the
chairman of this representative body and his bimonthly journal Kom€unizme Kars¸ı
M€ucadele became the organ of the Federation.38 Berk managed to host a diverse
group of nationalist figures at their first major event on 14 December 1950, when
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right-wing celebrities including Minister of Education Tevfik _Ileri, the famous
nationalist poet Arif Nihat Asya, the emerging leader of the Anatolianism movement
Nurettin Topc¸u, and Atsız’s associate _Ismet T€umt€urk paraded before a large audi-
ence.39 After their first annual meeting on 1 April 1951, Berk announced in the name
of the representatives of all constitutive societies and organizations that they agreed
on the non-affiliated and above-parties status of the Federation  an important
statement given the crushing victory of the DP the previous year  and that they
were determined to protect the sacred values (mukaddesat) of the Muslim-Turkish
youth. Berk also disclosed their decision to take one step further toward unification
by abolishing all constitutive societies and organizations and redesigning the Federa-
tion as a society, which would then represent Turkish nationalists of all stripes.40
After a long discussion, the Federation of Nationalists was renamed the Turkish
Nationalists Society (T€urk Milliyetc¸iler Dernegi or TNS).
An eight-member committee prepared a draft statute and defined the aim of the
TNS as ‘bringing all nationalists together and advancing Turkish nationalism, based
on the principles of God [Allah], homeland, history, language, tradition, art, family,
morality, freedom and national sacred values [mill^ı mukaddesat]’.41 The fact that a
reference to God was made in the statute and that God preceded all other so-called
objective and subjective elements of national identity was a novelty in the history of
Turkish nationalism, and did not fail to ignite opposition from the audience. One
unnamed representative argued that the reference to God ought to be deleted,
because God was intrinsically alluded to in the concept of ‘national sacred values’.
Another representative, Fethi Gemuhluoglu, disagreed: nations could have different
sets of ‘sacred values’, he said, and unlike in the case of Turkish nationalism, those
did not necessarily include God. Even when they did, Gemuhluoglu claimed, the con-
tent is subject to change during times of ‘mass neurosis’  an obvious allusion to the
Kemalist Revolution. After the discussion, the statute was put to a vote and accepted
by a great majority  without any changes.42
There were other signs of Islamization of the non-Kemalist nationalist movement,
now represented by the TNS. Two Democrat members of parliament, Sait Bilgic¸ and
Tahsin Tola, were emblematic of the trend of a new type of nationalist, who com-
bined nationalism with a strong dose of Islam. Both were quite active in the TNS
and Bilgic¸ was actually elected to preside over the annual meetings in 1951 and 1952.
What made their role special was that both Bilgic¸ and Tola represented the province
of Isparta, where the founder of the Nurculuk movement, Said Nursi,43 lived in exile
from 1926 onward. The two had extensive contacts with the Kurdish cleric, who was
at the time patiently building the most influential Islamic movement of twentieth-
century Turkey. Tola was particularly close to the Nurcu leader: he obtained the
long-awaited permit to publish Said Nursi’s works in the Roman alphabet and acted
as the unofficial messenger between the movement and Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes.44
Another unmistakeable sign of Islamization was the elevation of Ayasofya into a
symbol of Turkish nationalism.45 The Church of Hagia Sophia was consecrated in
the sixth century AD as the seat of the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople and
remained so until the Ottoman conquest in 1453, after which it was converted into
Muslim use and came to be known as the Ayasofya Mosque. In 1935, Atat€urk recon-
verted the building into a museum, thereby stirring a controversy that goes on to this
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day. What remained until the 1950s as a quarrel strictly between the Kemalists and
the conservative Islamists expanded after 1952 to include the non-Kemalist national-
ists as well. As the 500th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of _Istanbul was
approaching, the TNS took the opportunity to join the campaign to reverse the deci-
sion of 1935 and reopen Ayasofya as a mosque.46 The allure of appropriating Ayaso-
fya as a symbol of Turkish nationalism was so captivating that even the otherwise
secularist Atsız could not resist the temptation and fantasized  in a characteristi-
cally quixotic fashion  about forming a band of lightly armed followers who would
forcibly take over the building from guards and then perform the first Islamic prayers
there in two decades.47
There were, however, limits to Atsız’s fantasies and also to the extent to which he
could tolerate the increasingly religious overtones of the new discourse of national-
ism. Altan Deliorman, who was then a young but very close associate of Atsız,
described the situation at the TNS as a ‘coalition’ between the disciples of Nurettin
Topc¸u, Remzi Oguz Arık48 and Atsız, a very broad spectrum that included the
mukaddesatc¸ılar, the Anatolianists and, finally, the Racist-Turanists.49 Although
they tried hard to downplay ideological differences, this was clearly a marriage of
convenience, consummated more by perceptions of common enemies than natural
affinity. While Atsız’s journal Orkun published numerous articles in support of the
mukaddesatc¸ılar, shielding them from accusations in the Kemalist press of being
reactionaries (m€urteciler),50 Atsız himself did not hide his displeasure with the rising
tide of religious fervour.51 Without outside intervention, tensions between the secular
and the religious factions within the TNS would most probably have reached boiling
point as early as the mid-1950s. A rupture, however, was not going to occur, or
rather it was postponed until the 1960s, because an increasingly nervous DP govern-
ment decided to intervene and terminate the activities of the TNS.
On the verge of being liquidated as a political movement in 1944, the non-Kemalist
nationalists  both secular and religious  were given a second lease of life first by
the RPP, and then by the Democrats to be employed as the proverbial firing squad,
who could be (and were) extremely useful against the leftists and whose activities
could easily be disowned by the government. Yet two things seem to have bothered
the DP government in the early 1950s. First, these radical activists, who coalesced
around the TNS, did not make do with attacking the left-wingers only, but actually
often preferred to lash out against Atat€urk, _In€on€u, the Kemalist reforms and espe-
cially the principle of la€ıcite. The Democrats were delighted if _In€on€u, the leader of
the main opposition party, was their victim; however, the DP leadership, and partic-
ularly President Bayar, had no tolerance for angry outbursts against Atat€urk, and
when dozens of Atat€urk statues were vandalized in 1950 and 1951,52 the DP govern-
ment responded with Law No.5816 Concerning Crimes against Atat€urk, passed on
31 July 1951, making defamation of Atat€urk a punishable crime. Moreover, the DP
leadership was also alarmed by the growing number of TNS branches all over the
country  more than 80 in 1953  and probably wanted to prevent an impending
schism. Thus, Prime Minister Menderes used the assassination attempt on the liberal
journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman as a pretext to crack down on the radical right and
in a speech on 17 January 1953 he gave the first signal of a wave of tough measures
that brought to mind the stormy year 1944.53 On 22 January, an Ankara court
ordered all TNS branches to cease their activities; on 31 January, the Isparta MPs
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Bilgic¸ and Tola were expelled from the DP; and, finally, on 4 April, the court closed
down the three-year-old TNS.54
Coupled with the almost forcible government takeover of the _Istanbul Fetih
Cemiyeti (_Istanbul Conquest Society),55 Atsız’s appointment to an isolating position
at the S€uleymaniye Library of Manuscripts, Tevfik _Ileri’s removal from the cabinet
and the closure of the Nation Party in 1954 on charges of anti-secularism, these
measures confirmed the crystallization of a state policy of marginalizing the political
influence of radical right-wing nationalism. This, however, was not a purge and was
never meant to be. The DP leadership did not intend to antagonize a large voter
group, which they considered a natural component of their party base, all the more
so when the 1954 general elections were approaching. Rather, the outcome of this
intra-party crisis took the shape of a compromise: with the TNS gone, non-Kemalist
nationalists were now expected to refrain from autonomous behaviour and to limit
their activities strictly to the anti-communist front; in return, they would be allowed
to remain in the governing right-wing DP bloc. This modus vivendi, which showed
both the strengths and weaknesses of the non-Kemalist nationalists, was going to be
sealed in 1954 with the readmission of Bilgic¸ and Tola into the DP group in the
parliament.
Despite Atsız’s objections, the non-Kemalist nationalists kept a low profile and
respected the terms of this compromise for the rest of the 1950s. In the meanwhile,
Islamization of the nationalist movement continued unabated. Three individuals
contributed more than anyone else during the 1950s to the popularization of a new
version of Turkish nationalism, which was now increasingly stripped from its associ-
ation with secularism and westernization and, instead, was being reinvented as
Muslim-Turkish nationalism. Two of those individuals, _Ismail Ha^mi Danis¸mend
and Osman Zeki Y€uksel (Serdengec¸ti) could hardly be called ideologues. They were
not systematic thinkers and did not leave behind a distinct nationalist school of
thought or a hard-core group of followers. Their great achievement, however, was to
coin new discourses and slogans to disseminate nationalism among those segments
of the Turkish society who had thus far been unreceptive to secular nationalist pro-
paganda. In other words, the nationalist worldview, which could not penetrate the
Turkish periphery in its Kemalist version, now started to make significant inroads in
its newly fashioned Islamic guise.
While largely ignored in the literature, Danis¸mend’s 1959 book, T€urk Irkı Nic¸in
M€usl€uman Olmus¸tur?56 (Why Did the Turkish Race Convert to Islam?), contained
nearly all of the most important themes of the Turkish-Islamic discourse for decades
to come. Danis¸mend argued that Umayyad racism, which favoured Arabs, prevented
conversion of Turks to Islam until the tenth and eleventh centuries, but otherwise
Turks had a natural predisposition towards Islam. Their pre-Islamic religion centred
on a single, omnipotent God in heaven; Turks believed in the eternity of the human
soul and a second life after death in another world; and the ideal of jihad was a per-
fect match for their ambition to expand out of the Inner Asian steppe.57 Danis¸mend
considered the Turkish path to Islam a ‘magnificent exception’ in that, of all the
other Muslim peoples who converted after being conquered by the Arab armies in
the early years of Islam, the Turkish conversion was not preceded by conquest.58 If
anything, it was the Qarakhanid Turks who conquered the Muslim Samanids in
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Transoxiana and then embraced the new faith voluntarily, because Islam was only a
more sophisticated form of their former religion. Danis¸mend’s description of pre-
Islamic Turks as ‘proto-Muslims’59 was destined to appear again and again in the
Turkish nationalist literature as a justification for the Islamic turn.60 Furthermore,
Danis¸mend maintained that Islam and Turkishness had become inseparable, not
only because of natural affinity, but also for the reason that this was a mutually bene-
ficial relationship: Turks saved Sunni Islam from its external  Byzantium and the
Crusaders  and internal  Shiite Buyid and Fatimid dynasties  enemies; in return,
Islam opened up the way before them to the West, provided Turkic dynasties from
India to the Mediterranean with religious legitimacy, and helped preserve the Turk-
ish ethnic identity.61
Compared to Danis¸mend, Serdengec¸ti was an incomparably more popular figure
in the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı circles due to his antinomian, one-man struggle against
the Kemalist political and social order.62 He survived the 1944 trials, but was dis-
missed from Ankara University, after which he lost all faith in the system and started
an Islamic-nationalist crusade against the RPP and the Kemalist establishment in his
journal Serdengec¸ti (194762).63 It was in this journal that he invented the legendary
slogan, which would be taken on by successive nationalist parties: Tanrı Dagı Kadar
T€urk, Hira Dagı Kadar M€usl€umanız (We are as Turkish as Mount Tengri and as
Muslim as Mount Hira). Serdengec¸ti’s use of two historically significant mountains
as metaphors for emphasizing the inseparability of the Turkish and Islamic compo-
nents of Turkish identity resonated among the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı youth. Tengri
or the Tian Shan Mountains in Central Asia are associated with the historic
homeland of the ancient Turkic peoples, whereas Mount Hira was where Prophet
Muhammad is believed to have received the first revelation from God.
Unlike the former two, Nurettin Topc¸u was a more sophisticated thinker and
should be considered an ideologue rather than a popularizer.64 The first Turk ever to
get a Sorbonne PhD in philosophy, Topc¸u began a lifelong teaching career in
Turkish high schools in 1935. In Paris, Topc¸u was under the double influence of the
religious-modernist French philosopher Maurice Blondel and the Anatolianist
Remzi Oguz Arık, who was a fellow Turkish graduate student at the Sorbonne. Back
in Turkey, he attempted to produce a synthesis of Blondel and Arık with the help of
new sources of inspiration. His father-in-law H€useyin Avni Ulas¸, a silenced oppo-
nent of Atat€urk and _In€on€u, bequeathed to him an intense anti-Kemalism;
Naqshbandi sheikh Abd€ulaziz Bekkine, on the other hand, introduced Topc¸u to
sufism and taught him the availability of another path to Islam as ‘lived experience’,
far removed from the Islam of the official ulema, whom Topc¸u greatly disliked. The
contours of this synthesis began to appear in Topc¸u’s famous journal Hareket 
published intermittently from 1939 until his death in 1975  and in several powerful
books.65 In those, he argued that the Sunni Islamic faith provided the necessary elan
vital for the Seljuk and Ottoman Turkish expansion in the past and it would fulfil the
same function again if modern-day Anatolian Sunni Muslims resolved the double
binds of positivist Kemalism and formalist Islam of the ulema, both equally devoid
of philosophical depth according to Topc¸u. The emphasis on Sunnism was impossi-
ble to overestimate. Topc¸u’s vision of nationalism, for example, approached Turkish
Alevis  approximately 20 per cent of the Turkish population  with great suspicion
and nearly excluded them because of their former contacts with Shiite Safavid Iran.
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Nevertheless, Topc¸u’s critique of contemporary Islam as an empty shell was already
making things complicated for his milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı audience, who were inter-
ested in simple, jingoistic messages of unity in their fight against Kemalism and com-
munism. When he started to make passing references to Islamic socialism in the
1960s, many of his followers deserted his cause, except for a devoted few, who con-
tinued to spread his message and contributed to a great revival of interest in Topc¸u
after the 1980s.
During its golden age from 1908 to 1944, that is when it gradually became the domi-
nant ideology of the late imperial and early republican intelligentsia, Turkish nation-
alism could be described as a positivist, westernizing and secular framework of
thought. Following the break between the Kemalist and non-Kemalist nationalists
in 1944, that outlook was going to change drastically. The schism of 1944 was essen-
tially a result of disagreements between Kemalists and the Racist-Turanist Atsız cir-
cle over questions of racism and homeland.66 However, in the aftermath of the 1944
trials the non-Kemalist nationalists branched off into several groups and while Atsız
and his followers were being increasingly marginalized, the Islamic and Anatolia-
centred discourse challenged Atsız’s secular racism, which aimed to unite all Turks in
the world. The shift in the discourse was exemplified by the huge popularity of
Danis¸mend, Serdengec¸ti and Topc¸u as new, alternative leaders of opinion. The vast
majority of young converts to various branches of non-Kemalist nationalism revered
Atsız as a giant of nationalist thought and as a model to be emulated, but they were
not really interested in Atsız’s rebellion against Kemalism on racist and Turanist
grounds. Those were his battles, not theirs. As a matter of fact, on Islam, that one
issue which was so much dearer to them, Atsız was dangerously close to the
Kemalists.
Atsız was also aware in the early 1950s that developments on his home turf threat-
ened to cut the ground from under him. At that point, he could have responded by
modifying his position slightly to make room for at least some Islamic content so that
all non-Kemalist nationalists could close ranks around him. A move along those lines
could have indeed transformed him into the undisputed leader of non-Kemalist
nationalism and his movement into a formidable force in Turkish politics. Such was
the divisive potential of the question of Islam, however, that the middle ground could
not be found. On the contrary, his commitment to secular Turkish nationalism
became even more entrenched and he began to see the Sunni Islamic influence, which
went hand in hand with Anatolianism, as a great threat to the Turkish nation, compa-
rable to the threat posed by communism.67 Atsız was never going to attempt to repeat
the right-wing coalition of the TNS experiment again and, what is more, whatever
remained of that coalition after Atsız’s attacks on Topc¸u and Danis¸mend in the latter
half of the 1950s collapsed altogether when a group of young army officers toppled
the DP government in 1960 and ushered in an entirely new era in Turkish politics.
The coup d’etat of 1960 was a watershed event in the history of Turkish national-
ism. The officers’ committee, which took over the government, was not united by a
common cause,68 and as a result in the first few months after the takeover power was
concentrated in the hands of a faction called the Fourteen, led by Colonel Alparslan
T€urkes¸. T€urkes¸ was not a stranger to nationalist circles.69 He had long-standing con-
tacts with Atsız dating back to the 1930s and he was the only army officer charged
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with Racist-Turanism at the 1944 trials. He was exonerated in 1947, returned to the
army, but continued to have a reputation for being a diehard nationalist. Therefore,
his ascent to power kindled hopes that military rule would turn into a nationalist dic-
tatorship. Those hopes were soon dashed, because other members of the officers’
committee grew restive over T€urkes¸’ increasing autonomy and, finally, eliminated
the junta of the Fourteen by exiling them to Turkish embassies abroad.70
That was not the end of the story, however. During those few months that he
wielded real power in Ankara, T€urkes¸ convinced a core group of non-Kemalist
nationalists  and possibly Atsız  that he was the long-expected political leader of
Turkish nationalism. Thus, his exile was seen as a temporary setback and even from
New Delhi, where he was posted, T€urkes¸ prepared the ground for his return.71 In
other words, from 1960 onwards the decades-old dream of establishing a nationalist
party and coming to power alone suddenly looked like a realistic goal. The stipula-
tions of the 1961 Constitution, too, were going to fragment the Turkish political cen-
tre further and pave the way for new political parties on the left and the right. Under
those circumstances, the question of party doctrine  and who would shape and
articulate it  became an imminent concern. It is no coincidence that the on-going
rift between the Atsız circle and the Islamic-leaning Anatolianists burst into the open
right at that juncture.
The opening salvo in this battle was a pamphlet, published by Atsız in 1961,
attacking Ali Fuad Bas¸gil, an elderly professor of constitutional law who was
known in the nationalist circles for his Anatolianist views.72 Then came Atsız’s open
intervention into the editorial policy of the nationalist, pro-T€urkes¸ journal Mill^ı
Yol. The editor of the journal was Atsız’s close associate _Ismet T€umt€urk, but their
decades-old camaraderie did not help T€umt€urk when he published a number of
articles in the journal with the hope of endearing T€urkes¸ to the more Islamic-leaning
nationalists as well. One of those articles portrayed T€urkes¸ as a ‘pious colonel’
(imanlı albay), who neither smoked nor drank alcohol, and who lectured his five chil-
dren on religion and morality after dinner.73 Worse, T€umt€urk also tried to reach out
to the beleaguered Nurcus  followers of Said Nursi  to win them over to the
T€urkes¸ camp.74 Atsız’s response was swift: Mill^ı Yol ceased publication immedi-
ately, and in the last issue of the journal T€umt€urk attributed this decision to the
‘disapproval of some well-known individuals in the nationalist front’.75 Not only
did this episode display the power of Atsız in 1962, but it also showed the divisive
potential of Islam among nationalists, so much so that it ruined Atsız’s relationship
with T€umt€urk.
Roughly around the same time, Atsız founded the Society of Turkists (T€urkc¸€uler
Dernegi) as an exclusively Racist-Turanist forum, which he expected to keep under
his thumb.76 Drawing a lesson from the TNS experience, Atsız was now obsessively
stringent about admitting new members and determined to keep nationalists with
even the slightest Islamist inclination out of this organization. Already in 1963, how-
ever, Atsız was facing a rising tide of the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ıs, whose numbers
grew by leaps and bounds compared to a handful of recruits he was able to make. To
be able to establish full control over the branches of society, Atsız sent his young dis-
ciple Altan Deliorman on a tour of Anatolian towns. Deliorman returned back with
disheartening news and summarized his observations in a report: he only heard com-
plaints from people he talked to, particularly about Atsız’s stance against the Nurcus
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and other Islamists; this was staining the movement’s reputation and driving a wedge
between nationalists and conservatives, Deliorman argued. Faced with this stark
reality, Atsız did not flinch. If those branches did not follow his instructions, he
thought it would be better to close them down. Incidentally, he also began to suspect
that Deliorman, too, had gone over to the Islamist side and the two rapidly parted
ways after this incident.77
The slowly simmering conflict between the Atsız circle and the Islamic-leaning
nationalists also resulted in a public confrontation in the summer of 1963 during
another study/inspection visit to Izmir by Atsız’s brother Nejdet Sanc¸ar. There are
no reliable records of what exactly happened, but Kemal Fedai Cos¸kuner recounted
that a serious argument broke out at one of Sanc¸ar’s talks between Sanc¸ar and those
in the audience who found his views on Islam very offensive.78 Since Cos¸kuner him-
self was very critical of Atsız at that point, it is possible that he embellished the story
and inflated the proportions of the quarrel. Yet it is clear that a series of events in
1962 and 1963 convinced Atsız and Sanc¸ar that while secular nationalists were grad-
ually being outnumbered and marginalized, nationalists who amalgamated their eth-
nic identity with Islam came to dominate the movement numerically. From that
point on, Atsız, Sanc¸ar and other prominent members of their circle declared war on
political Islamists, Anatolianists, Nurcus  that is, anyone who offered an alterna-
tive paradigm on the right which did not recognize the supremacy of racial-ethnic
bonds over religion.79
Atsız and Sanc¸ar coined a new term for their opponents in this struggle, calling
them ‘political Islamists’ (siyas^ı €ummetc¸iler), this being the first appearance of the
term in Turkish political history.80 Sanc¸ar described the political Islamist as someone
who believes that, (a) all Muslims constitute one single political entity and, hence,
should be subject to an overarching Muslim state, (b) nationalism is un-Islamic
because it divides the Muslim ummah and (c) Turkey as a nation-state and Turkish-
ness as an identity are therefore irrelevant.81 Defined as such, Atsız, Sanc¸ar and their
followers disagreed with political Islam profoundly on several grounds and attacked
it fiercely.
To begin with, they regarded religion and nationalism as two essentially different
and potentially competing ideologies for organizing human society. In Islam, they
saw an antiquated social order, one that was not in harmony with the Zeitgeist and
therefore slowly crumbling under the onslaught of modernity. The Islamic ulema, for
instance, only reminded them of ‘preachers of medieval dogma’,82 or ‘pro-Arab and
Arabic-loving bigots, whose days are over’.83 Nationalism, on the other hand, had
become the organizing principle of modern international society since the end of the
First World War and President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.84 Under these new condi-
tions, Islam, Atsız claimed, might ‘survive as long as it could keep up with life’, and
even then it should be separated from state affairs and be confined to the private
sphere as a matter of individual conscience.85 Atsız did not refrain from declaring
nationalism superior to religion in terms of the chivalry and nobility of the idea,
because:
[Nationalism] is a feeling of self-sacrifice. It is the idea of sacrificing oneself with-
out expecting anything in return. In this regard, it is even superior to religion.
The religious man sacrifices himself in order to obtain God’s favour and entry
706 _I. Ayt€urk
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
1 0
3 J
uly
 20
15
 
into paradise in another world. This kind of sacrifice cannot be compared with
the self-sacrifice of the nationalist, who hurls himself into the dark pit of obliv-
ion without any personal gain.86
To compare religion with nationalism and find it wanting was a daring move for a
right-wing leader in those days, but Atsız had the nerve to put that it in writing.
Second, members of the Atsız circle were also strongly opinionated about the role
of Islam in the making of Turkish identity. Their writings are full of comparisons of
race/ethnicity versus religion in the make-up of a modern Turk, and they unambigu-
ously prioritized blood relationship and ethnic bonds over all other markers of
national identity. Membership in a nation could not be a voluntary act according to
this view; on the contrary, it is an unavoidable and unchangeable fact of nature,
which overrides every other adopted and secondary feeling of belonging. Therefore,
Islam, which requires a voluntary declaration of faith, cannot undo or significantly
alter what members of a nation inherit genetically from their ancestors. It is no sur-
prise that when Sanc¸ar defined the Turkish nation as ‘a society, connected by bonds
of race/ethnicity (soy), language, culture, common goals, homeland, history and reli-
gion’,87 he placed religion at the bottom of this carefully worded hierarchy of
ingredients.
Demoting religion to a subordinate role showed how the Atsız circle was categori-
cally different from all milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı groups and especially from the Anato-
lianists. The latter had long been arguing that conversion to Islam was a defining
moment not only in Turkish history, but also in the Turkish national character and
transformed the erstwhile barbarian nomads into founders of ‘the illustrious Turkish-
Islamic civilisation’. This strategy, which obviously aimed to disown the pre-Islamic 
and, in the case of the Anatolianists, the pre-Anatolian  portion of Turkish history,
enraged the secular Racist-Turanists. The impact of Islam should not be exaggerated,
wrote Sanc¸ar, because Turkish history is a seamless whole, rendered indivisible by the
ethnic-racial Turkish character:
History is witness to the fact that the Turk’s power to establish great states and
to rule the course of history is in his nature as a gift from God. . . . Our nation
does not owe this spiritual power to anything other than qualities inherent in its
race. . . . If an unmatched power, bestowed by God, did not exist in the Turkish
race, that is, if the [Turks], too, were an ordinary society like other nations,
would religion be enough to sustain military, social, humanistic accomplish-
ments and those magnificent states continuously for centuries? . . . If Islam
[alone] had granted the opportunity and power to establish great states and to
rule the course of history, should not we have expected other Muslim nations to
become magnificent societies just like Turks? But what use is religion, if the
nation does not have the right qualities?88
Likewise, they objected to the increasingly common use of terms such as the
‘Muslim-Turkish nation’ or ‘Muslim-Turkish morality’. The Turks already have a
name, blurted Hayrani Ilgar, a young disciple of Atsız; they are simply called the
Turkish nation. To add the adjective ‘Muslim’ was both wrong and of no use.89 It
was patently wrong, because the emphasis on the Sunni Muslim identity threatened
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to divide the Turkish nation into secular and pious communities in addition to the
concern that it discriminated against the sizeable community of non-Sunni, Alevi
Turks and those others who did not profess any religion at all.90
Third, the Atsız circle’s opposition to political Islam brought to the fore a theoreti-
cally very interesting question: who is a right-winger in Turkey? Atsız and Sanc¸ar
complained justifiably that there was great confusion in Turkish political thought
regarding the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’. Atsız, Sanc¸ar and their disciples were consid-
ered right-wingers on account of their nationalism and unbridled hatred for commu-
nism; but Atsız also disclosed that their firm belief in the need for social justice made
them appreciate leftist socio-economic policies.91 More importantly, they refused to
be put in the same right-wing basket with their right-wing enemies. Anyone who is
an enemy of communism was categorized as a right-winger, both Atsız and Sanc¸ar
protested, which reduced the Turkish right into a disjointed, incoherent front, a
hodgepodge of isolated groups and their opinion leaders who were not even on talk-
ing terms with one another. How could the Turkists of the Atsız circle be ranked
together with the ‘bigoted political Islamists’, who maintained that ‘if you die for the
nation [and not for the cause of Islam] you go to hell’?92 Political Islamists were fight-
ing for the unification of all Muslims and therefore they were internationalists,
opined Atsız; and, like all other ‘internationalist cosmopolitans’, they should rather
be called leftists. ‘We [alone] are the rightists: the Turkists’, he proclaimed proudly.93
Finally, Atsız and Sanc¸ar denounced political Islam as the modern face of Arab
imperialism, which had, for centuries, enslaved the hearts and minds of the Turkish
people. Turks wasted their ‘national energy’ for the sake of religion and fought and
killed one another in Sunni versus Shiite sectarian wars. They were wooed into
believing that their language, Turkish, was worthless, that their ancestors were bar-
barian pagans, that it was a sin to give their children Turkish names, that they
became civilized people only after the encounter with Islam. All this was nonsense
according to Atsız: Turks need not get involved in the row between Ali and Mua-
wiyah; they should be mourning the death of K€ur S¸ad and not the martyrdom of
Husayn; they should be avenging the fall of Kazan and Crimea and not that of Mus-
lim Spain.94 Atsız did not fail to mention a widely held belief in Turkey that the
Arabs stabbed the Ottoman Empire in the back during the First World War.95 Now
the political Islamists were betraying the Turkish nation once again by denying its
history and culture, and hence its very existence. In that sense, they were as danger-
ous as the communists.
Although Atsız and his followers often targeted rival nationalist or Islamist opin-
ion leaders such as Ali Fuat Bas¸gil, Nurettin Topc¸u, M€unevver Ayas¸lı and Necip
Fazıl Kısak€urek,96 it seems that they focused particularly on the Nurcus and the
Nurculuk Movement after 1963. For Atsız, Nurcus were ‘a foolish herd shepherded
by an ignorant Kurd called Said-i Nurs^ı’, ‘a bunch of losers, who get together to
read the books Said-i Nurs^ı wrote in his incomprehensible Kurdish-Turkish, as if
they are studying atomic physics or a theorem by Einstein’.97 Said himself was
regarded as a Kurdish nationalist and an enemy of the Turkish nation, a regrettable
product of the short-sighted policies of the early republic, when the Turkish state did
not fulfil its mission to educate a new generation of Turkish ulema.98 As a matter of
fact, the debate on the Nurcus presented Atsız and Sanc¸ar with the perfect opportu-
nity to clarify their views on Islam and to dispel widely circulating rumours that Atsız
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and his circle converted to Shamanism, the pre-Islamic religion of the Turks. Atsız,
for example, repeatedly gave his blessing to the imam-hatip schools in the hope that
enlightened religious scholars and prayer leaders could push back ‘ignorant Kurds’
such as Said Nursi.99 Sanc¸ar made an open declaration of his faith in Islam to be
able to reassure those who were scared away from Racist-Turanism by the accusa-
tion of apostasy:
Here is the truth: I am one of the millions of Muslim Turks. But let me say this
right away that if I were a shamanist, I would declare that, too, without hesita-
tion. Because belief in one religion or another is a completely private matter and
it is nobody’s business. Yes, I am a Muslim Turk. But a Muslim Turk, who
opposes bigotry and use of religion for political gain.100
Likewise, they continued to encourage conversion of the Ayasofya Museum into a
mosque101 and committed themselves publicly to the formula: ‘Turkishness and
Islam are two holy, fundamental sources [of Turkish identity], which infused each
other and combined inextricably’.102 ‘Turkish nationalists are Muslims, but they are
not Islamists’,103 wrote Sanc¸ar, and added that political Islamists were making a big
mistake by assuming that they could glorify Islam by undermining Turkishness.104
At the same time as the Atsız circle was repositioning as the secular alternative to the
Islamic-leaning Turkish nationalists, significant developments were taking place in
the Turkish political scene. After a two-year-long exile, Alparslan T€urkes¸ was finally
allowed to return in 1963 and he immediately set about transforming what was until
then a social movement into a political party. He mobilized some loyal members of
the Fourteen and nationalist youth all over the country to join the Republican
Peasant-Nation Party (Cumhuriyetc¸i K€oyl€u Millet Partisi, RPNP), a minor party on
the centre-right that was suffering from a chronic leadership struggle. Gaining
control of party organs from within, T€urkes¸ became the new party leader in 1965.105
His plan was to overhaul the RPNP and remake it as the only party of the Turkish
radical right. Timing could not have been better, because the closure of the DP after
the 1960 coup released the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı voters and the non-Kemalist
nationalist intellectuals from their half-hearted alliance with the centre-right and,
moreover, a not insignificant percentage of centre-right voters moved to the radical
right under the impact of the sham trials of the former DP leadership and subsequent
execution by hanging of former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other
cabinet members. New centre-right parties, founded after the return to multi-party
democracy in 1961, were extremely careful not to provoke the military and, there-
fore, could not meet radical right demands for justice for the still imprisoned DP elite
and vengeance for the ‘martyred prime minister’.
The great irony of Alparslan T€urkes¸’ political career was that his target audience
held him  at least partially  responsible for the coup and the terrible end of Mend-
eres,106 who, following his execution, turned into a right-wing martyr and the patron
saint of democracy in Turkey. Those few months in 1960 during which T€urkes¸ was
the strongman of the junta continued to haunt him throughout his career and stood
in his way well into the 1970s, preventing him from consolidating his control over
radical right votes. Right before the 1969 general elections, for example, the Nurcus,
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who had thrown their support behind S€uleyman Demirel’s Justice Party, used their
extensive network in Anatolia to distribute a propaganda pamphlet that accused
T€urkes¸ of being an unbeliever, among many other things. One of the co-authors of
the pamphlet was Bekir Berk, who had converted from being a nationalist leader to
the Nurculuk Movement during the 1950s, showing the permeability of the border
that separated nationalists from the Islamists.107
Knowing too well that this could nip his political career in the bud, T€urkes¸’ fol-
lowers tried to recast his image even before his return to Turkey. _Ismet T€umt€urk
published a copy of T€urkes¸’ 1961 letter from exile to his former colleagues in the
junta, warning them not to carry out death sentences against Menderes and his min-
isters.108 The biggest obstacle that stood between T€urkes¸ and success in the ballot
box, however, was the question of Islam, and more had to be done in this regard
than T€umt€urk’s occasional journal articles that portrayed T€urkes¸ as the ‘pious
colonel’.
Indeed, at the beginning, T€urkes¸’ RPNP looked just like another secular party in
the Turkish political system. The 254-article-long party programme mentioned reli-
gion only in Articles 16 and 17, whose content was so weak and spiritless that they
could probably be found in any other right-wing party programme at the time.109
Other early party documents either repeated the same line, or bypassed the topic
altogether.110 Likewise, the new guiding principles of nationalist politics, the so-
called ‘Nine Lights’ doctrine, published under the name of T€urkes¸ in 1965, did not
contain any reference to religion. T€urkes¸ defined the principle of moralism
(ahla^kc¸ılık), for example, in a strictly nationalist framework, suggesting vaguely that
‘Turkish morality ought to be in harmony with Turkish tradition, Turkish spirit, and
the beliefs of the Turkish nation’, without explaining what those beliefs were.111 Any
explicit reference to Islam was conspicuously absent at this point in the discourse of
T€urkes¸ and his party.112
However, electoral defeats in, first, the general elections in 1965, and then the sen-
ate elections in 1966, showed beyond doubt the impracticality of the policy of reach-
ing out to the milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı voter base as long as the RPNP did not adopt
a more Islamic jargon. By 1967, T€urkes¸ was seriously considering an Islamic turn
and his right-hand man in the party, D€undar Tas¸er,113 laid the foundations of a new
nationalist discourse, which incorporated Islam as the most important marker of
Turkish identity. T€urkes¸ articulated this new policy line in his address to the Eighth
Congress of the RPNP in 1967, where he began to use the term ‘Muslim-Turkish
nation’, and invited everyone to ‘the Islamic morality and virtue . . . to the path of
truth, to the path of GOD’. He entered the congress centre as thousands chanted
‘Allah€uekber’ (God is great) and, following the secular ritual of observing a moment
of silence, T€urkes¸ and others raised their hands up and said Islamic prayers in
Arabic. RPNP members, T€urkes¸ demanded in his address, had to read ‘the Book
[the Koran]’ of the people and endeavour to ‘connect the corridors of technical
universities, science faculties and laboratories with the corridors of theological
schools’.114 T€urkes¸’ speech was an unmistakable sign of the transformation of the
RPNP from a secular to an Islamic-leaning nationalist party. When Osman Y€uksel
Serdengec¸ti joined the RPNP group in the Turkish parliament in April 1968 with
great fanfare and invited all milliyetc¸i-mukaddesatc¸ı voters to follow him, the sea
change in party ideology was symbolically confirmed.115
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On the other hand, those developments should not be taken to mean that T€urkes¸
and Tas¸er were able to push them through without opposition. The secular faction
within the party  to which T€urkes¸ himself once belonged  was by no means inef-
fective, nor was it only composed of a bunch of old-timers, living in a fantasy world.
The fact that their numbers dwindled within the party rank and file did not mean
that their voice was heard less. Numan Esin, a member of the Fourteen, resigned
from the party in July 1967, citing ‘retreat from the Atat€urkist path’ as the immediate
reason for his resignation, and he was followed by two other members of the Four-
teen, S¸efik Soyuy€uce and M€unir K€oseoglu, as well as the party secretary Mustafa
Kaplan in 1968.116 The departure of high-ranking party members and old colleagues
put enormous pressure on T€urkes¸, who was trying to hold the party together as the
1969 general elections were approaching. The final and potentially most serious chal-
lenge to his authority, however, came from the Atsız circle right before and during
the Ninth RPNP Congress in February 1969.
Only months away from the general elections in October, T€urkes¸ and Tas¸er
wanted to use the party congress as a public relations stunt to showcase their new
doctrine. The Ninth Congress was planned to reaffirm change by two enormously
significant acts: adopting a new party name and an emblem to replace those that had
been inherited from the former party leadership.117 These two questions had been on
the party’s agenda since 1967, but they were postponed until 1969 due to lack of con-
sensus on, particularly, what the new emblem should be. There was no serious objec-
tion to the new party name, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc¸i Hareket Partisi,
NAP), but the Islamic-leaning majority within the party supported a new emblem
composed of three crescents, which symbolized the Islamic-Ottoman past, whereas
the Atsız faction refused to accept any emblem but the long-standing symbol of pan-
Turkism, the grey wolf. The conflict between the two groups, the so-called crescent-
ists (hilalciler) and wolfists (kurtc¸ular) threatened to split the party into two and
proved once more the divisive potential of religious questions.118 T€urkes¸ did not
openly declare support for one of the proposed emblems, but he clearly sided with
the crescentists and tried to make sure that the conflict over the emblem would cause
the party the least possible damage. In all likelihood, the decision to hold the con-
gress in the backwater town of Adana was the outcome of this calculation. More
likely destinations such as Ankara or _Istanbul posed serious challenges, because
members of the Atsız faction were concentrated in those two cities and could have
exerted disproportionate influence over congress proceedings by filling the congress
centre with supporters.
Knowing that the wolfist Atsız youth would in any case be a minority at the con-
gress, T€urkes¸ hoped to save them the embarrassment of defeat and his party an
immense trauma, which could only lead to secession. Negotiations over the new
emblem, therefore, continued until the last moment, but a face-saving formula could
not be found. The two different visions of non-Kemalist nationalism had now
become enemies and they collided head-on on 9 February 1969 in what turned out to
be a zero-sum battle over the soul of the party. No one doubted the winner. After a
long day of fiery speeches and occasional resort to physical violence, which involved
forcibly removing the Atsız youth from the building, the crescentists carried the
day.119 This was a historical event that marked the most important turning point in
the history of Turkish nationalism since 1944. The clash between the secular and
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Islamic-leaning branches had finally reached a boiling point and however much
T€urkes¸ wanted to avoid direct confrontation, in the end he was left with no other
choice but to dethrone Atsız, the intellectual father of non-Kemalist nationalism. In
the following months and years, the Atsız circle continued its activities mainly in
_Istanbul, but lost its political influence over party policy-making. With the passing of
Atsız and Sanc¸ar in 1975, the secular vein in non-Kemalist nationalism died out and
while Atsız still commanded respect for his other views and uncompromising charac-
ter, his secular approach to Islam became a taboo subject in nationalist politics and
virtually impossible to revive.
Was this the inevitable outcome? To paraphrase Darendelioglu and C¸etinsaya, shall
we conclude that interpretations of Turkish nationalism, which relegated Islam to a
secondary role in the making of Turkishness, were nothing but aberrations from the
normal course of events? Can we, for instance, consider the Atsız phenomenon an
inexplicable and unimportant gap in the otherwise regular pattern of Islamic-leaning
nationalism?120 Indeed, the majority of the non-Kemalist nationalists converted to
an Islamic discourse in the aftermath of the 1969 Adana Congress. The Islamic turn
in Turkish nationalism had become so entrenched and seemed so irreversible that it
led many academic observers to project this trend backwards in time to the late nine-
teenth century and the first half of the twentieth, ignoring profound ill-feelings
between nationalists and Islamists during this period. Actually, nationalist politi-
cians and academics in Turkey did not even stop there and pushed the temporal
boundaries of a ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (T€urk- _Islam Sentezi) or ‘Turkish-Islamic
Goal’ (T€urk- _Islam €Ulk€us€u)121 far back in history with the assumption that Turks
had developed a symbiotic relationship with Islam since their conversion in the tenth
and eleventh centuries. Yet the evidence presented in this article points to the conclu-
sion that, before 1969, there was no consensus among Turkish nationalists over the
question of Islam. On the contrary, Islam was rather the most controversial topic
that produced regular infighting and alienated nationalist factions from each other.
The Islamic discourse, which started to appear in nationalist publications during
the 1950s for the first time and became dominant after 1969, was hardly a symptom
of a natural affinity, nor does it justify an essentialist approach. To put it differently,
the two discourses did not click immediately and naturally; the Islamic turn in
Turkish nationalism was clearly a product of demographic change, anti-Kemalist
sentiments, and electoral behaviour in Cold War Turkey. Moreover, the rise of politi-
cal Islam cannot be regarded as a singularly Turkish phenomenon either. The Islamist
challenge to secular regimes in the 1960s and 1970s shook the foundations of many
Arab and non-Arab countries in the Middle East and Turkey was not an exception.122
Unlike pan-Arab nationalism, which saw Islam as the greatest achievement of the
Arab people and therefore embraced it, Turkish nationalism developed a very strong
secular streak from the beginning. After all, Turkish nationalism was born as a secular
response to the failure of pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism in arresting the decline
of the empire. Its politically dominant Kemalist branch had always been explicitly
secular, while even within the non-Kemalist nationalism secularists made a strong
comeback with the Atsız circle, that is until they, too, were politically extinguished for
good in 1969.
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Notes
This article was written during my stay at the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations,
University of Chicago as a Fulbright Fellow. I would like to thank my host Holly Shissler for creating the
best research environment. My thanks also go to Gavin Brockett, who sent me extensive comments on a
slightly different, earlier version. If I did persist in some of my views, it’s not for lack of good advice.
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